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Is data protection the new privacy? Over a century ago 
the Bostonians Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued 
that traditional (US) legal doctrines were inadequate to deal 
with modern concerns about privacy which had emerged 
alongside the use of new surveillance technologies such as 
the “instantaneous photographs” and the media practices of 
the yellow press (“The right to privacy”, (1890) 4 Harvard 
Law Review 193). Their argument for legal recognition of “the 
right to privacy”, defined as a right to be “let alone” and 
characterised as a right of “inviolate personality”, gave rise to 
a century of tort law reform in the United States. Already, by 
1960, as William Prosser said, torts of intrusion on seclusion, 
public disclosure of private facts, false light publicity and 
misappropriation of name or likeness could be identified as 
falling within the general rubric of privacy torts (“Privacy”, 
(1960) California Law Review 383). Moreover, notwithstanding 
the absence of any explicit reference to a constitutional right to 
privacy in the US Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has treated 
privacy as underpinning aspects of the Bill’s enumerated rights 
in cases such Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) and Lawrence 
v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003) (fourteenth amendment right of 
due process as applied to laws against abortion and sodomy), 
Bartnicki v Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001) (first amendment right of 
free speech as applied of private disclosure), and Katz v United 
States, 389 US 347 (1967) and United States v Jones, 565 US 
___, 132 SCt 945 (2012) (fourth amendment restrictions on 
search and seizure applied to private material).
The 20th century American approach of emphasising 
privacy as a key concept shaping doctrinal development and 
constitutional discourse has also expanded into other common 
law jurisdictions. The constitutional dimension may be less 
overt (with the partial exception of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms of 1982, where privacy has had a 
significant shaping effect on the s 8 search and seizure clause). 
But a growing emphasis on privacy has been evident in the 
reform of private law doctrine especially in the courts. In more 
conservative jurisdictions, such as Australia, courts have been 
largely content so far to see their traditional doctrines develop 
in ways that accord with privacy. However, in more progressive 
jurisdictions courts have gone further to fashion their own 
privacy torts, taking the US jurisprudence as a model in whole 
or part. For instance, a public disclosure of private facts tort 
was recognised by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking 
v Runting [2005] NZLR 1. And an intrusion on seclusion tort 
became the basis for the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones v Tsige, 
2012 OJ No 148 to deal with the defendant’s surreptitious 
electronic surveillance of the plaintiff ’s bank records. (A New 
Zealand court recognised a similar tort in C v Holland NZHC 
2155). More generally, as Sharpe JA observed in Jones v Tsige:
Canadian, English and American courts and commentators almost 
invariably take the seminal articles of S D Warren & L D Brandeis, 
“The Right to Privacy”, (1890) 4 Harv L R 193 and William 
L Prosser, “Privacy” (1960), 48 Cal L R 383 as their starting 
point. ([2012] OJ No 148 at [16])
England however has been more influenced by a longer 
tradition of privacy protection in Continental Europe, which 
Warren and Brandeis acknowledged as an influence on their 
own arguments for direct legal protection of privacy in the US 
in 1890 – noting that “the right to privacy ... has already found 
expression in the law of France” (4 Harvard Law Review at 214). 
There is still no general privacy doctrine in this jurisdiction. 
That was apparently ruled out by the House of Lords in 
Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. But in the wake 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 giving effect to the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950, including its article 8 
right to “private life”, a substantial English jurisprudence has 
developed towards acknowledging a tort of misuse of private 
information as an outgrowth of the traditional doctrine of 
breach of confidence. As the “new methodology” is explained 
in McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, Murray v Express Newspapers Plc 
[2009] Ch 481 and Mosley v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd  [2008] 
EWHC 1777 (QB), the tort responds directly to the United 
Kingdom’s obligation to respect the right to private life in 
article 8 of the ECHR.
But now in Europe there is a new legal concept being talked 
of which is said to represent a step beyond privacy and which 
has also been declared the subject of a fundamental right. That 
is the right to “protection of personal data” in article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000. 
According to the Treaty of Lisbon 2007, which finally came 
into force in December 2009, this is part of the constitutional 
fabric of the European Union. Is a right to data protection 
a hyperbolic statement, a reflection of an over-expansion of 
rights in the post-human rights era, leading to a fragmentation 
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of the very idea of “a right” – as eloquently noted in the Beastie 
Boys’ sarcastic refrain “you gotta fight for your right to party”? 
Or is language of a right to data protection rather a prediction 
that data protection will eventually supersede privacy as the 
preferred legal technology of the information age?
There is much to suggest the latter. The Charter’s article 
8 right to data protection is identified as a basis for the EU’s 
current draft Data Protection Regulation 2012. That this has 
been framed with the internet especially in mind is clear from 
the provisions dealing with tracking, profiling, data portability 
and correction and erasure of data files (the so-called “right to 
be forgotten”) (see arts 16-20). Individuals who suffer damage 
from violation of these standards may seek compensation 
in court (see art 78). But perhaps more importantly data 
protection commissioners and their offices have significant 
powers of their own, including the power to award penalties of 
up to €1 million  or 2 per cent of annual worldwide turnover of 
companies that fail to comply (see arti 77) – a not insignificant 
amount. Interestingly, there is no reference in the draft 
Regulation to the right to private life, although the Charter 
itself mentions the right to “respect for private life” in article 
7.
Although the draft Regulation is yet to become law, the right to 
data protection in the EU Charter is shaping the European legal 
landscape. The right was noted, for instance, by the European 
Court of Justice as a reason to limit the making of general 
judicial orders requiring internet service providers and online 
social networks to monitor their users’ communications for 
possible copyright infringements in the cases of Scarlet Extended 
SA v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA 
(SABAM) (CJ, Third Chamber, C-70/10, November 24, 2011) 
and Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA 
(SABAM) v Netlog NV (CJ, Third Chamber, C-360/10, February 
16, 2012), both referred from Belgian courts. Further, the 
international anti-counterfeiting trade agreement ACTA was 
rejected by the European Parliament in July 2012, exercising 
its powers under the Lisbon Treaty, after the European Data 
Protection Supervisor issued an opinion in April that its 
measures may operate in breach of articles 7 and 8 of the EU 
Charter as well as article 8 of the ECHR (see http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_EDPS-12-9_en.htm). 
Already, existing data protection standards prescribed by the 
EU’s Data Protection Directive 1995 have had a significant effect 
in continental European jurisdictions, where data protection 
laws were often in place even before the Directive. In particular, 
data protection authorities and courts in Germany and France 
and other continental jurisdictions have used their powers for 
a range of purposes in recent years, including with respect to 
Facebook, Google and Twitter and the like. Even in England, 
where the influence of the European-prescribed standards has 
been less pronounced (and Lisbon strictly speaking will not 
change that, given the UK’s reservation that the Charter rights 
should not alter domestic law) there are tentative suggestions 
of a growing importance being accorded to data protection. 
For instance, section 35 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) 
(regarding disclosures of personal data required by law) was a 
centre-piece of the recent Supreme Court decision in Rugby 
Football Union v Consolidated Information Services Limited (Formerly 
Viagogo) (In Liquidation) [2012] UKSC 55, a case involving 
the making of a Norwich Pharmacal disclosure order of names 
and addresses of individuals allegedly involved in rugby match 
ticket scalping on the defendant’s Viagogo website. Lord Kerr 
also referred in the case to the right to data protection in the 
EU Charter as relevant to the balancing process to be taken 
under section 35 (at [26]-[45]). 
Further,  the fact that Lord Leveson in his recent report on 
The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (available at http://www.
levesoninquiry.org.uk/?s=report) recommended reform of 
the UK Data Protection Act’s section 32 journalism exception 
to limit its application to cases where “objectively, ... the likely 
interest in privacy resulting from the processing of the data is 
outweighed by the public interest in data protection” (rec 48), 
suggests that data protection might, if the reforms were made, 
take on a significant role in controlling the press’s and more 
generally media’s dealings with personal information. 
The UK’s Data Protection Act has been referred to from 
time to time as a possible additional source of protection in 
cases that are principally about privacy and/or confidentiality. 
Examples are Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2004] 2 AC 
457; Murray v Express Newspapers and Tchenguiz v Imerman [2010] 
EWCA Civ 908. The Rugby Football Union case can be seen in 
the same light – and indeed article 8 of the ECHR was also 
referred to in that judgment. In these cases it is still not clear 
what role data protection law might serve going beyond the 
protection already accorded by other doctrines. This is not 
just because of the Act’s current rather uncertainly framed 
journalism exception (which in any event was not relevant in the 
Tchenguiz and Rugby Football Union cases). The Court of Appeal’s 
decision in the early case of Durant v Financial Services Authority 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1746 that “personal data” in section 1 of 
the Act are essentially private biographical information has 
meant that, as the Court of Appeal said in Tchenguiz, “there 
is authority which supports the notion that that expression 
[ie personal data] should be given a narrow meaning” (at 
[96]). However, the Information Commissioner’s Office takes 
a broader view, saying it is enough that data “’relate to’ the 
identifiable living individual, whether in personal or family 
life, business or profession”, following the European Article 
29 Data Protection Working Party (see <http://www.ico.gov.
uk/news/current_topics/what_is_personal_data.aspx>) – a 
position which seems closer to the Rugby Football Union case 
where names and addresses were treated as personal data (and 
see the discussion at [32]). Certainly, the draft Regulation 
Amicus Curiae       Issue 93     Spring 2013
4
makes clear that for its purposes personal data will embrace 
“any information relating to a data subject” (see art 4). 
Looking further afield, the European Directive’s restrictions 
on cross-border transfers to countries that do not comply 
with its standards have helped to foster an international trend 
towards treating data protection as an important regulatory 
concept – building on the momentum of an earlier Council 
of Europe Convention on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981 as 
well as some OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 1980. 
As Graham Greenleaf ’s research shows, a large number of 
the world’s jurisdictions have enacted or are in the process 
of enacting data protection laws (“Global Data Privacy Laws: 
89 Countries, and Accelerating”, Queen Mary University 
of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 
98/2012, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2000034 – in fact the number is now over 
90). Moreover, many of these jurisdictions – including Canada, 
New Zealand and Australia – have taken steps to ensure that 
they not only have in place comprehensive data protection laws 
but that these laws meet minimum EU standards (albeit the 
process has not yet been altogether successful in Australia’s 
case). Indeed, as Simon Chesterman observes with respect to 
Singapore’s new data protection legislation, even in countries 
that have traditionally paid little attention to privacy, data 
protection law are being enacted to ensure that the countries 
can participate equally in the international trade environment 
(“After Privacy: The Rise of Facebook, the Fall of Wikileaks, 
and the Future of Data Protection”, Working Paper, April 18, 
2012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042144). 
The US, of course, represents an important exception to 
the spread of EU-style data protection standards, with its 
negotiated “safe harbor” exception. And in general the US has 
long had a patchy record on data protection despite its Privacy 
Act 1974 (which is limited to federal government agencies). 
Some further substantive equivalence may be achieved if the 
“Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” proposed in a White House 
paper of February 2012 (available at www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf) becomes US law, or even 
the rather weaker Federal Trade Commission recommendations 
in its report published in March  2012 (available at www.ftc.
gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf) – including their 
provisions made about online tracking and profiling. And 
already, the Federal Trade Commissioner in recent years has 
actively used his powers under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act of 1914 to insist that internet companies are reasonably 
transparent in their treatment of personal data and substantial 
fines have been issued against inter alia Google and the social 
network site Path for non-compliance with these requirements 
– showing that although data protection may be a vilified 
concept in the US, consumer protection principles may in 
practice operate somewhat in the way of data protection.   
But there is also much to suggest that privacy will continue 
to play an important role in all these jurisdictions. One reason 
undoubtedly is the long tradition of privacy. And it is not simply 
a history that began with Warren and Brandeis’s important 
1890 article. References to privacy can be found in ancient 
cases such as Entick v Carrington (1765) S C 19 How St Tri 1030 
and Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 H & Tw 1, being cases still 
cited and relied on in modern discussions of privacy (as, for 
instance, with the lengthy discussion of Entick v Carrington in 
US v Jones). International instruments, such as the ECHR, the 
UN Declaration on Human Rights 1948 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 give further 
support to the right to privacy as a traditional and venerable 
right. By contrast, the right to data protection is essentially a 
post-ECHR right – historically representing a response to new 
computer technologies of the 1960s and 1970s accompanied 
by fears about how these might be systematically used to 
monitor and control citizens. 
Indeed, even now, the right to data protection does not 
have the same prestige-value as the right to privacy. It may 
have been characterised as a right of “informational self-
determination”, or “Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung”, 
in the German Census Act case of 1983 (65 BVerfGE 1 at 43). 
But a central focus is the bureaucratic treatment of personal 
data; and principal concerns – when considered apart from 
privacy – are “equality and due process”, as explained by Paul 
de Hert and Serge Gutwirth (“Data Protection in the Case 
Law of Strasbourg and Luxemburg” in Gutwirth et al, eds, 
Reinventing Data Protection, Dordrecht, Springer, 2009, 3 at 6). 
By contrast, Warren and Brandeis in their 1890 article could 
point persuasively to a right to privacy as essentially a right of 
personality reflecting deeply humanistic values. Similarly, in the 
more modern language of the ECtHR in the recent case of 
Von Hannover v Germany (no 2) 40660/08 [2012] ECHR 228 
(February 7, 2012) 
… the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is 
primarily intended to ensure the development, without outside 
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations 
with other human beings ([2012] ECHR 228 at [95]). 
In the end, this may explain why data protection is 
often intermingled with privacy, as if to give it an added 
expressive value. And, while it may be accepted that data can 
be “personal” yet not “private”, the latter covering “aspects 
relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name, photo, 
or physical and moral integrity” (Von Hannover v Germany (No 
2) [2012] ECHR 228 at [95]), a great range of personal data 
has been treated as private especially in recent cases. Fairly 
anodyne family activities were treated as prima facie within the 
right to private life in Von Hannover v Germany (No 2), although 
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the countervailing interest in freedom of expression protected 
under article 10 ECHR prevailed in the circumstances of the 
case. Further, in Copland v United Kingdom [2007] ECHR 253 
information in the plaintiff ’s emails was treated as private 
(without fine distinctions between aspects that were private 
and those that were not). And in the Ontario case of Jones v 
Tsige the plaintiff ’s bank records were also treated as generically 
private. 
Similarly, names and addresses were considered not merely 
personal data in the Rugby Football Union case but private 
information as well – even if the interests on the side of data 
protection/privacy were not especially high when weighed 
against the “entirely worthy motive of the RFU in seeking to 
maintain the price of its tickets at a reasonable level”, which 
could be seen both to promote the sport of rugby and to 
serve the interests of “members of the public who wish to 
avail of the chance to attend international matches”(at [45]). 
These cases may represent a more modern view of “private” 
information than Durant v Financial Services Authority where the 
FSA’s records of Durant’s complaint about Barclays Bank and 
the FSA’s investigation of the complaint were considered too 
far removed from the plaintiff ’s identity to qualify as “private” 
(or “personal”).
By the same token, the importance of data protection may 
also be bolstered by reference to confidentiality. Although 
confidentiality is not recognised as a human right, in the way 
of privacy, the idea of “trust and confidence” is an ancient and 
venerable concept in common law jurisdictions especially and 
its concerns have been treated as overlapping with those of 
data protection. Of course, privacy and confidentiality may 
also overlap. Indeed, in Tchenguiz v Imerman, where the plaintiff 
successfully claimed that his financial information held in 
a computer in an office shared with the first two defendants 
should be protected from their unauthorised access and use 
under a broad reading of the breach of confidence doctrine, 
the court said that this doctrine had to be seen as developing 
in tandem with the misuse of private information tort, stating 
that “consistency and coherence” are important given the 
“substantially increased focus on the right to privacy and 
confidentiality … over the past twenty years” ([2010] EWCA 
Civ 908 at [67]). At the same time, the court’s reference to 
the potential application of the Data Protection Act to the 
defendants’ conduct suggests that not only is the dividing line 
between a right to privacy and the right to data protection 
a thin one, becoming even thinner over time, so also is the 
line with breach of confidence – reinforcing the impression 
that traditional doctrines and concepts may be supplemented 
by newer ones from time to time but these can continue to 
develop in a harmonious fashion.  
While the language of a “right to data protection” used in 
conjunction with a “right to privacy”, or “private life”, may 
imply the breakdown of a traditional distinction between a 
human right which is important to the individual’s sense of 
self and a social right whose concern is with the workings of 
society, what we may ultimately get is a set of rights which 
combine both individual and social elements – reflecting, as 
Paul Schwartz says, the fact that
In the computer age, individual freedom cannot rest on a dream 
of being let alone by an ever-reduced government. Today, the 
safeguarding of liberty requires a legally structured pattern of 
access to and limitations on the use of personal information. 
The  state  has  a  critical role  in  ensuring that  the  processing  
of  personal  information  is  compatible  with  the individual’s  
ability to participate  in  democratic self-rule. (“Privacy and 
participation: personal information and public sector regulation 
in the United States” (1995) 80 Iowa Law Review 557 at 
618) 
But in practice the greatest change wrought by data 
protection standards may be around state and more generally 
public perceptions, of the best way to address systemic 
problems that go beyond the kinds of individual claims that 
privacy claimants have raised in their court cases in the past, 
with data protection and its institutional rubric including its 
data protection commissioners and offices seen as particularly 
well suited for these problems.  
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